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Oei Tiong Ham Concern was a sugar-based
conglomerate in the Netherlands Indies (or In-
donesia in the postwar period), founded by a
peranakan Chinese named Oei Tiong Ham
(1866-1924). N.V. Handel Maatschappij
Kian Gwan was a sugar-centered international
trading company, and N.V. Algemeene
Maatschappij tot Exploitatie der Oei Tiong
Ham Suikerfabrieken was a sugar production
company which operated five sugar planta-
tions and mills in Java. From sugar, Oei
Tiong Ham diversified into other products.
Kian Gwan became over time a general
trading company with offices abroad. In the
early 1930s, it had Kian Gwan Western Agency,
Ltd., in London, Kian Gwan (Malaya),
Ltd., in Singapore and Kian Gwan Company,
India, Ltd., which covered British India and
China, with offices in Calcutta, Bombay,
Karachi, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Amoy.
And to facilitate trading as well as to expand
business interests, the warehousing company
N.V. Midden Java Veem, the regional ship-
ping company N.V. Heap Eng Moh Steamship
Co., and the bank N.V. Bank Vereeniging
Oei Tiong Ham were set up. Furthermore, in
Krebet, Malang in East Java, where a sugar
plantation and a sugar mill were operated, Oei
* S'JJ¥:~t:5l::, The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
Tiong Ham started tapioca production by set-
ting up a plantation and a flour mill. In addi-
tion, he went into property development and
management (mainly to provide housing for
the workers on the plantations).!)
A plantation in Java was quite different
from what we usually know of as a plantation.
For example, Oei Tiong Ham Concern did not
own the land it used to grow sugar cane.
Agricultural land belonged to indigenous
peasants, and no corporation was allowed to
buy it. Thus, it had to be leased from
peasants. Furthermore, no manual labor
could be brought from outside. It had to
come from the peasants in the area where the
plantation was located. A corporation could
invest in land improvement and infrastruc-
ture, and organize and manage agricultural
production on the land it leased. So, in this
respect, it was not a sub-contract system, but
it differed from a typical plantation-an ex-
panse of contiguous land over which the
owner had complete control.
In the prewar period, Oei Tiong Ham Con-
1) For an overview of Oei Tiong Ham Concern in the
early 1930s, see "The Story of Krebet,"
[Semarang], Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan,
1932 and "The Oei Tiong Ham Concern: A Short
Survey of its Development and Progress, "
[Semarang], Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan,
1934.
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cern was the first as well as largest Chinese-
owned business empire in the region we call
today the ASEAN. It started growing rap-
idly in the 1890s, and had become a diversified
business group by the early 1910s. In the
prewar period, Thailand was the backwater of
Southeast Asia, and it was not until the 1930s
that a modern business conglomerate began
appearing there in its embryo form (for exam-
ple, the Wang Lee group). In the Philippines,
a modem business appeared earlier than in
Thailand, but it was confined largely to a
single industry (for example, China Banking
Corporation), and no modem business con-
glomerate appeared there in the prewar
period. In British Malaya, since it became an
important supply source for the West and the
Chinese were given a great deal of freedom in
the economy, as in the Netherlands East In-
dies, modem business conglomerates ap-
peared relatively early, but none equaled the
size of Oei Tiong Ham Concern. The
business fortunes of such successful tin
miners as Eu Tong Sen and Loke Yew were
more limited in size as well in scope, and also
they were short-lived. The Ho Hong group
built by Lim Peng Siang in the 1910s was the
most diversified group in Malaya at that time,
but it could not have been larger than Oei
Tiong Ham Concern (which, after all, man-
aged five sugar plantations and owned five sugar
mills, among others), and, since it started to
decline after the First World War, its life was
short. Tan Kah Kee's business empire,
which reached its peak a little later than the
Ho Hong group, was also limited in scope and,
as in the case of the Ho Hong group, short-
lived (it began facing financial trouble in the
late 1920s and went bankrupt several years
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later).2l
The trading company Kian Gwan was
founded by Oei Tiong Ham's father, Oei Tjie
Sien (1835-1900), an immigrant from Tong-an
in Ch'uanchou District, Fukien Province.
Unlike most of the Chinese who came to
Southeast Asia in the 19th century, Tjie Sien
seems to have had a basic Chinese classical
education in his youth. For some reason, he
became involved in the Taiping Rebellion,
and had to flee the country. Around 1858 he
came to Semarang in Central Java, where he
started petty trading. His granddaughter,
Oei Hui Lan, describes his position at this
stage as follows:
With his small hoardings he purchased
cheap porcelain saucers and bowls which he
peddled from door to door in baskets hung
from a bamboo yoke. He bargained dog-
gedly, haggled shrewdly over each copper
coin, then re-invested infinitesimal profits in
more bowls and saucers and small packets
of rice. Slowly, painstakingly, Tjie Sien
managed to save [Koo 1943: 6].
Semarang was a good place for a Chinese to
settle. It being the major harbor for Central
Java, such native produce as sugar and gam-
bir were brought there to be shipped outside,
and Chinese wares and other foreign products
passed through there for distribution in the
city and its hinterland. In fact, at the time Tjie
Sien arrived, Semarang was the largest com-
mercial city in all Java. Batavia did not have
much hinterland trade, and in the case of
Surabaya, it was after the advent of corporate
2) For further discussion on Chinese capitalism in this
period, see [Yoshihara 1988: Ch. ill].
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capitalism and the age of steamships that it
became the premier city of Java [Dnghokham
1989: 160].
In the mid-19th century, when Tjie Sien
arrived in Semarang, the production of export
crops was still under the government-super-
vised culture system. Thus, despite its premier
position in trading, Semarang did not have
such vitality as it would enjoy in the late 19th
century. It was with the passage of the
Agrarian Law in 1870 that Dutch private
capital began pouring into Java to set up plan-
tations and processing facilities (sugar planta-
tions and mills in particular). As a result of
such large inflow of capital from the
Netherlands, the commercial landscape of
Java (as well as Sumatra later on) went
through a dramatic transformation. In par-
ticular, Central and East Java emerged as the
major center of sugar production in the
world. As the port of Central Java,
Semarang began experiencing a rapid in-
crease in business activities, especially in
sugar and sugar-related trading, in the 1870s.
Dei Tjie Sien was well prepared to take ad-
vantage of this expansion [Liem 1979: 8-18].
After several years of hard work, he set up the
trading company Kian Gwan in 1863. At this
stage, it may have been an ordinary trading
company, but Tjoa Soe Tjong and Liem
Tjwan Ling tend to give us the impression
that at that time, Kian Gwan was already a
large, modern company. Liem Tjwan Ling
says that Dei Tjie Sien had saved three million
guilders by that time [Liem 1979: 10],
whereas Tjoa Soe Tjong says that it was formed
as a limited liability company and managed
by an outsider named Ang Tai Lion [Tjoa
1963: 604]. There is no data to refute these
claims, but it is difficult to take what they say
at face value since they may be unconsciously
exaggerating the modernness of Kian Gwan
at that time, projecting into it the modern em-
bryo of what later came to be known as Dei
Tiong Ham Concern. Undoubtedly,
however, with Kian Gwan, Dei Tjie Sien
became a wholesale trader (a considerable im-
provement of his fortune from a peddler), and
in the next few decades, with hard work and
business acumen, he made it a respectable
trading company.
It is most natural to think that Kian Gwan
formed the basis for Dei Tiong Ham's
business career. In fact, Tjoa Soe Tjong and
Liem Thian Joe expect us to believe that [Tjoa
1963: 604-605; Coppel 1989: 184]. But Liem
Tjwan Ling and Dei Hui Lan, though they do
not deny this interpretation, tell us, in pass-
ing, a legend which can throw a different light
on it. This is about a retired German consul
who decided to spend the rest of his life in
Java. He leased a house from Tjie Sien and
came to know his son, Dei Tiong Ham, who
often visited him to collect rent. The German·
subsequently became quite impressed with
his ability, and offered a substantial sum of
money (Dei Hui Lan says it was 300,000
guilders, whereas Liem Tjwan Ling says it
was 300,000 dollars) for Dei Tiong Ham to
start a business. Dei Tiong Ham used this
money to buy sugar mills in the 1890s [Koo
1943: 12; Liem 1979: 48].
This may be regarded as sheer legend, but
Dei Tiong Ham may have first gone into
business on his own, become fairly successful
in this way, and taken over his father's
business, Kian Gwan. His life philosophy and
method of business seem to have been quite
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different from those of his father. Tjie Sien
was proud of being a traditional Chinese. He
spoke Chinese at home, wore a Chinese dress
and a pigtail, and ate Chinese (Hokkien)
food. And he insisted on having his family
follow a Chinese life style [Liem 1979: 17-
18]. In contrast, Oei Tiong Ham was more
modem-oriented. On the difference between
them, his daughter Hui Lan makes the follow-
ing observation:
He [Oei Tiong Ham] was out of sympathy
with the narrow, conventional Chinese of
Semarang [to this group Dei Tjie Sien
belonged] and wanted to be entirely in-
dependent. Though it was impossible to
break his racial ties, he adopted as many oc-
cidental ideas as possible both in his private
life and in his business affairs [Koo 1943:
32-33].
He had loathed his queue, found it both
incongruous and embarrassing, but was
forced to keep it as long as Grandfather Tjie
Sien was alive. Once Papa's hair was cut in
European style he sprayed his head each
morning with Pinaud's hair lotion ...
[Koo 1943: 34].
This difference in life philosophy between
father and son must have caused conflicts be-
tween them in doing business together, and
may have eventually resulted in his son's in-
dependence. Oei Hui Lan states the problem
as follows:
He [Tiong Ham] was soon plunged into
further conflict with his father, whose nar-
row, old Chinese business methods made
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him chafe with impatience. Increasing fric-
tion seemed unavoidable unless Tiong Ham
launched out on his own [Koo 1943: 11].
In the mid-1890s, when Oei Tiong Ham was
still in his mid-twenties, which was several
years before his father died, he began buying
sugar mills. If he became independent
because of his differences with his father and
thus without his help, how did he amass such
a large sum of money as. needed to buy five
sugar mills at that time? He may have been an
extraordinarily clever trader and made a for-
tune in a short time, but it may be more
reasonable to think that he had a financial
backer, such as the former German consul as
told in the legend.
This legend becomes more credible as we
start questioning how Oei Tiong Ham came to
know the Western method of business. He
went to a Chinese school, and did not speak
Dutch. Liem Tjwan Ling says that Oei Tiong
Ham understood some Dutch since he signed
letters in. Dutch without getting them
translated. But Oei Hui Lan says that "he
never succeeded in learning a word of Dutch"
[Koo 1943: 33], and this is confirmed by Oei
Tjong Ie [Interview: Dei Tjong Ie 1989: 191].
About signing letters, if they were ordinary
letters, Oei Tiong Ham may have trusted his
subordinates, and thus, it could not be taken
as evidence of his understanding of the Dutch
language.
If he did not understand Dutch, how did he
talk to Dutchmen? There is no question that
he did talk with some Dutchmen on intimate
terms. Although Oei Tjong Ie denies this
[Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 191], his half- .
sister Hui Lan tells us about Sijthof, the
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Dutch Resident of Semarang, who became an
intimate friend of Oei Tiong Ham's. Unlike
in British Malaya, where few British officials
spoke Malay and Chinese businessmen had to
know English if they wanted to talk with
them, many Dutch officials and businessmen
spoke Malay well, and could talk to Chinese
who learned the language. Although it may
not have been on intimate terms, Oei Tiong
Ham must have discussed in Malay com-
plicated legal problems with his Dutch
lawyer, Baron van Heeckren [Koo 1943: 50].
When Oei Tiong Ham was still struggling,
contacts with Dutchmen must have been diffi-
cult. The two contacts cited above came
after he became a successful businessman.
So, a person like the former German consul
becomes important in understanding his early
years. He was retired and had a lot of free
time; he was educated enough to tell about the
West and its way of business (to act as a Ger-
man consul, he must have had some educa-
tion); and since he decided to retire in Java, he
must have spoken Malay. When Oei Tiong
Ham went to collect rent, he may have spent a
lot of time with him discussing various mat-
ters in Malay, and paid a number of purely
social visits in addition.
Another thing to note about Oei Tiong
Ham's early years is the fact that he made a
substantial sum of money as an opium
trader. Until around 1904, when the system
was abolished and the government-operated
opium regie took over, the Dutch colonial
government divided Java into various districts
and made opium trading in each district the
monopoly of its license holder. The license
was granted on an open-bidding basis to a
trustworthy Chinese who offered the highest
bid. Under this system, for about ten years
starting in the early 1890s, Oei Tiong Ham
became a major license holder in Central and
East Java (in Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakar-
ta, and Surabaya), and seemed to have made a
profit of about 18 million guilders [Coppel
1989: 185; Liem 1979: 31-32]. Tjoa Soe Tjong
argues that Oei Tiong Ham and some other
Chinese traders at that time used profits from
opium trading for business modernization
[Tjoa 1963: 604].
A Chinese business usually remained small,
being family owned and family managed, but
Oei Tiong Ham was an exception. To under-
stand what made him different from a typical
Chinese businessman, we should first note
some of his personal attributes. As Liem
Tjwan Ling points out, he was a bright person
and a hard worker [Liem 1979: 28-29]. When
he was studying in a Chinese school in
Semarang, he was the best student among his
classmates. After he started working, he
rarely left his office before his employees, and
at home, he usually went to bed after mid-
night. Also, he was probably a very energetic
person. A glimpse of this is given in the
following description of his appetite by his
daughter Oei Hui Lan:
Catering for my father was a difficult task,
as he was an enormous eater... he started
off [his breakfast] with a few mangoes or
papayas, followed by a bowl of steaming
porridge and climaxed with six fried eggs
and several slices of liver garnished with
lavish curls of bacon, all washed down with
bowls of tea. To compose his nerves after
this exertion father smoked two fat black
cigars [Koo 1943: 33].
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Of course, there were possibly many bright,
energetic persons at that time, so this was
hardly a sufficient condition for business suc-
cess. We should, however, keep in mind
some of the innate personal attributes which
had bearing on his success.
What made Oei Tiong Ham different from
an ordinary successful businessman was his
business method. He built his business very
much like an empire builder in the West, by
building up professional management and
diversifying into related fields. There were
other businessmen, like Lim Peng Siang, who
created a conglomerate in Malaya at about the
same time (though a little later and not as
diversified as Oei Tiong Ham Concern), but
what made him really unique among the suc-
cessful Chinese businessmen at that time was
the creation of professional management. In
his case, it was the recruitment not only of
competent Chinese from outside the family
(for example, he employed many profes-
sionals, e.g. engineers who graduated from
universities in the Netherlands), but also of a
number of Dutch professionals (engineers and
managers). In the late 1930s, at the Krebet
factory alone, several Europeans were work-
ing, and at the other four sugar mills, at least
all managers were Dutchmen [Interview: Oei
Tjong Ie 1989: 195]. Certainly, there were
some Chinese companies which employed one
or two Westerners, but there was none which
systematically employed so many Western
professionals as Oei Tiong Ham Concern
did. Basically, Oei Tiong Ham needed them
to make up for the lack of skills and know-how
which the Chinese had not yet mastered. He
delegated authority to these professionals
(Dutch as well as Chinese), and concentrated
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largely on their supervision and business
strategy.
About a typical Chinese businessman, Tjoa
Soe Tjong says: "Conservatism, nepotism,
and a limited knowledge of modem finance
and organization were his weaknesses" [Tjoa
1963: 605]. Even if the last problem was
solved with the spread of education, the first
two problems remained as barriers to Chinese
business modernization, especially in the late
19th century and the early 20th century when
Oei Tiong Ham was building his empire.
From the viewpoint of the typical Chinese
who were accused of nepotism and conser-
vatism, modem business techniques such as
delegation of authority were too risky, for by
trusting outsiders, for example, they were
more likely to be cheated than rewarded.
Although this was true in general, Oei Tiong
Ham's innovation was to recognize that there
were some competent Europeans and Chinese
outside the family who could be trusted, iden-
tify those people and use them in his
business. He must have made some mistakes
in judgment and suffered from their conse-
quences, but he made more right judgments
and from this, reaped large profits, clearly
much larger than the losses he suffered from
misjudgments.
It is interesting to ask how he could identify
competent, trustworthy people, but there is
no light shed on this in past writings. What
has simply been done is to attribute it to his in-
nate or acquired skill by stating that "[he] had
a knack for finding right people" [Interview:
Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 191] or that "he had a
remarkable flair for choosing brilliant up-and-
coming associates" [Koo 1943: 57]. But we
can be more specific about the contents of the
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skill. Since in hiring or promoting someone,
it is not certain whether he will ultimately
turn out to be trustworthy, decision has to be
made with some uncertainty, and some people
may have the skill to reduce it, one which they
have acquired over time in interpersonal rela-
tionships. Explaining how such a skill is ac-
quired or how it has been acquired is not sim-
ple. But another aspect of finding the "right
people" is identifying the functions of a post
to be filled and looking into the qualifications
of a person to be appointed to the post, and
this can be more easily explained. For exam-
ple, Oei Tiong Ham did not appoint a univer-
sity graduate to the top post of the trading com-
pany Kian Gwan, because he thought that a
"daring gambler" would fit it better than a
university graduate who probably lost the
gambling instinct in the process of rational
education [Tjoa 1963: 606]. This view was
formed probably through his experience in
sugar trading, the major activity of Kian
Gwan, which was quite speculative due to
wide price fluctuations. A little before he left
for Singapore, Oei Tiong Ham promoted a
pookkeeper without university education
(Tan Tek Peng) to the top post of Kian Gwan
tLiem 1979: 192].
! Entrusting management to people like Tan
ffek Peng had some drawbacks. Tan Tek
~eng may have been a "daring gambler" and
~een good at earning profits for Kian Gwan.
lBut he did not probably understand, or if he
understood, did not attach enough importance
,
to the need for building a rational business
organization. In Japan, for example, at the
time Tan Tek Peng was promoted, university
graduates were becoming dominant among
the top managers of major, especially zaiba-
tsu, companies. It was becomingmore impor-
tant for a top Japanese manager to act as the
coordinator of a management team, which
tried to gather as much relevant information
as possible (if necessary, from abroad) and
base their decision on rational calculation. At
the same time, Western business methods
were studied to improve on the incentive
system which would best motivate the
employees. But in the Concern, after Oei
Tiong Ham's death, the non-university
graduates like Tan Tek Peng tried to
dominate the university graduates by em-
phasizing "intuition" in doing business and
downgrading the importance of up-to-date in-
formation in decision making. Oei Tjong
Tjay, who took over Kian Gwan from his half
brother Tjong Hauw in the early 1950s,
blames Tan Tek Peng partly for the organiza-
tional mess he inherited. Tjong Tjay replaced
Tan Tek Peng with university-educated
Tjoa Soe Tjong [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay
1989: 226].
Oei Tiong Ham was well aware that Chinese
businesses often suffered from the succession
problem. One major problem was that in the
Chinese family, all sons could claim a roughly
equal share (this was unlike primogeniture
practiced in prewar Japan), and often decided
to split up the business founded by their
father instead of running it together.
Sometimes, the father created as many
businesses as the number of sons, instead of
concentrating on the expansion of his main
business, in order to make sure that the
transfer of ownership would go smoothly after
his death or retirement. Oei Tiong Ham
wanted to make sure that this would not hap-
pen.
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A more difficult problem was to whom
ownership should be transferred. As a
typical Chinese, he did not want his daughters
to inherit it. He had 13 sons and 13
daughters, so half of his children were left
out.3) In the case of an unincorporated firm,
which was the typical case at that time, this
could be decided within the family, but in the
case of such a large company as Oei Tiong
Ham Concern, to disinherit the daughters was
a problem since it could come under the Dutch
civil law, which was more egalitarian than the
Chinese adat law and gave the right of in-
heritance to daughters. Originally, such fam-
ily matters as inheritance were settled within
the Chinese community, but when a serious
dispute arose concerning large inheritance, it
was often taken to a Dutch court and settled
there [Onghokham 1989: 161]. So, even if
Oei Tiong Ham decided to disinherit his
daughters or any sons, this could be challenged
in court. This seems to have been a major
reason why he finally left for Singapore where
under the Anglo-Saxon law, it was possible to
disinherit some children [Interview: Oei
Tjong Tjay 1989: 224].
The next thing to do was to decide whether
he should choose all his sons as his heirs or
only some of them. Apparently, he could try
some sons in business, especially those who
had left school by the early 1920s when he
went to Singapore. Among them, appar-
ently, all but Oei Tjong Swan and Oei Tjong
Hauw were judged to be incompetent, and
were disinherited from his business. Then
the remaining question was what to do with
the younger sons who had not been tried (one
3) For a list of his wives and children with birth dates,
see the following appendix.
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was still in the mother's womb at the time of
his death). For some reason he decided to let
all of them inherit his business, thus naming
nine heirs altogether. They were one son
from the third wife, four sons from the fifth
wife, and another four sons from the seventh
(or second from the last) wife.
This decision may not have been final, and
he may have wanted to change it as his
younger sons got older and worked in his
business. He probably wanted to weed out
those he judged incompetent, as he had done
earlier. But unfortunately, he died suddenly
of a heart attack in 1924 at the age of 57. So,
this remained as an unfinished job [Interview:
Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 217].
In the beginning, the succession problem
did not seem to be too serious. Only two sons
(Oei Tjong Swan and Oei Tjong Hauw) had
reached majority and participated in manage-
ment. Of course, there must have been some
friction between the two. But before it got
worse, ostensively for health reason, Oei
Tjong Swan decided to pull out (he sold his
share to the other brothers) and left the
Netherlands East Indies for Europe. This
made it possible for Oei Tjong Hauw to
become a dominating figure in the family.
As a whole, Oei Tjong Hauw managed Oei
Tiong Ham Concern fairly well. Under his
management, Kian Gwan extended its interna-
tional as well as national network, and Oei
Tiong Ham Concern went into new areas,
such as rubber processing in Sumatra, which
was to become the mainstay of Kian Gwan In-
donesia in the postwar period, when sugar
ceased to be a viable export commodity under
the socialistic government of Sukarno. Oei
Tiong Hauw, however, probably because of
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his limited education (he was educated in
Semarang and never went to college), did not
seem to understand well that success in
modern business depends on organizational
development and efficiency. For example,
unlike the pyramid structure of a Japanese
zaibatsu, there was no holding company for
the group. With the power he wielded in the
1930s, he could have set up a holding com-
pany and put all major operating companies
under it if he had wanted to. Then, he could
have pooled the profits of those companies in-
to the holding company and use these to pay
dividends to the family shareholders to keep
off incompetent brothers from the company
[Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: 260].
But he did not set up a holding company,
and no dividends were ever paid during his
tenure. Then in the late 1930s, as the younger
brothers reached majority, problems began
cropping up, because even if some of them did
not want to get involved in business, since
there were no dividends to their shares, the
only way to assure a steady income was to
participate in management. Eventually, all
brothers who received inheritance par-
ticipated in management (the last brother who
joined the company was Oei Tjong Tjay, the
last son of Oei Tiong Ham's, who joined the
company in December 1948), and as was usu-
ally the case, some sons turned out to be
incompetent, in particular the three full
brothers of Oei Tjong Hauw. When they
started exercising their rights, problems
became serious, but not much could be done
since they had an equal share as the more com-
petent brothers. For example, if they wanted
something badly, even if it was not a viable
business proposition, they could have it [Inter-
view: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 207]. As a result,
discipline weakened, the line of authority got
blurred, and the exercise of strong leadership
became difficult. This is regarded as one ma-
jor reason for the decline of Oei Tiong Ham
Concern in the postwar period [Interview: Oei
Tjong Ie 1989: Section 15]. Oei Tjong
Hauw's sudden death in 1950 (due to a heart
attack) added to the problem. After this,
there was no overall organizational control:
the branches the brothers controlled became
their own "fiefs" [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay
1989: 258].
Tjoa Soe Tjong argues that a Japanese
zaibatsu avoided the succession problem
because it recruited its successor from outside
the family [Tjoa 1963: 607], but this is not
true. He seems to have mistaken the manag-
ing director for the successor of a Japanese
zaibatsu. The main reason for its long life
was the separation of management from
ownership. In the case of the Mitsui zaibatsu
in Japan's modern period, the owner family
rarely interfered in management; they left it
to its professional managers. This practice
was established in the process of evolution
over the preceding few centuries, as a matter
of necessity to perpetuate the family
business. For a young conglomerate like Oei
Tiong Ham Concern, this sort of tradition
could not be expected, but Oei Tiong Ham at
least could have restricted the participation of
his heirs in management to one, or at most a
few, by making the rest of his heirs rentiers
and strengthening the professional manage-
ment. The strength of a Japanese zaibatsu
lay in the independence its professional
management enjoyed.
The ownership structure created problems
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and hindered the smooth development of Oei
Tiong Ham Concern, but a change in business
climate in the postwar period was possibly a
more tragic thing for its history. Unlike in
the other former colonies in the ASEAN
region, independence did not come smoothly
in Indonesia. It had to be fought for, and the
political leadership which came to power after
independence rejected most of the economic
institutions which the Dutch had created dur-
ing the colonial period. It is true that this
anti-colonial reaction was moderate in the
beginning, but it accelerated over time as
Sukarno gained more power.
The most serious change for Oei Tiong
Ham Concern was government interference in
the economy. Tjoa Soe Tjong argues that
this started as early as the 1930s (soon after
the Great Depression began) [Tjoa 1963: 651],
but at that time, it was to regulate production
and distribution to overcome the problems
created by the Depression and was not in-
tended to be long-lasting. That is, it was in-
tended to save capitalism, not to destroy it. In
the postwar period, however, the nature of
government interference changed. Initially,
it was used to change the ownership structure
of capitalism as well as superimpose socialism
(government ownership) on capitalism, but
later when the government became more
disillusioned with capitalism (especially after
1955 when the Ali Sastroamidjojo govern-
ment was formed), it was used more and more
to replace capitalism with socialism. Under
this setting, any capitalist institution had to
suffer; Oei Tiong Ham Concern had to suffer
more, being the symbol of success of the
Chinese which the Indonesian government
thought of as something of a collaborator of
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Dutch colonialism.
Under this setting, Oei Tiong Ham Concern
declined, but it was not destined to disap-
pear. Although smaller in size, it could have
survived the Sukarno period and expanded
again in the New Order period, which revived
capitalism and has created a number of new
business conglomerates. Oei Tjong Ie argues
that one important reason for the end of its
life was a lack of strong leadership in the Oei
family after the death of Oei Tjong Hauw in
1950 [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 199,
211]. According to him, the best candidate to
succeed Tjong Hauw would have been himself,
but he was bypassed and the youngest brother,
Tjong Tjay, was selected. But, Tjong Ie
argues, Tjong Tjay was too young at that time
(he was around 27), and having lived most of
his life abroad, he did not know the Indone-
sian language and had difficulties in adjusting
to the rough and tumble of postwar Indone-
sian politics. He was simply the wrong per-
son to head Indonesian operation at that time,
and let it be taken over more and more by pro-
fessional managers like Tjoa Soe Tjong
whose loyalty to the family did not seem too
strong [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 211].
All this is refuted by Tjong Tjay [Interview:
Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: 227]. Although he was
inexperienced in the beginning, he sought
advice from his nephew Oei Ing Swie (Tjong
Hauw's eldest son) as well as from Tjoa Soe
Tjong. He acted as president director or
chairman of the board of directors of Kian
Gwan Indonesia, but in decision making, he
always consulted with Ing Swie and Tjoa Soe
Tjong, and if there was a difference of opin-
ion, he accepted a decision if the other two
supported it. Tjong Tjay argues that Tjoa
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Soe Tjong was a loyal as well as capable
manager and that Tjong Ie is not objective
since Tjoa Soe Tjong objected to the way
Tjong Ie wanted to manage Kian Gwan In-
donesia: his way was to use Indonesia as a
smuggling base for his Singapore operation.
Tjong Tjay did not stand idle, either, when
the business environment was changing in In-
donesia. Tjong Ie argues that since Tjong
Tjay could not speak Bahasa Indonesia, he
could not develop close contacts with the
military which, according to Tjong Ie, control-
led Indonesia [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989:
202]. But Tjong Tjay argues that in the 1950s,
it was politicians who controlled the govern-
ment, and that having close ties with the
military was not as important as his brother
argues [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay 1989:
229]. Tjong Tjay approached Partai Sosialis
Indonesia (PSI) and developed close contacts
with its leaders, such as Professor Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo. In a way, Oei Tiong Ham
Concern became the financier of PSI. At the
same time, Tjong Tjay developed close ties
with the moderate faction of Partai Nasional
Indonesia (PNI). Unfortunately, the political
situation changed quickly in the 1950s, and
once powerful persons were out not only of
the government but also of the country (for ex-
ample, Professor Sumitro). In the late 1950s,
politics became too radical for capitalists like
Tjong Tjay, and there were no political
leaders who were powerful enough to protect
his business.
At this point, as his brother Tjong Ie
argues, he should have stayed in Indonesia
and developed close ties with the military.
But by 1958 he had become fed up with In-
donesia and left for the Netherlands. And
since there were no Oei shareholders left,
management was entrusted to Tjoa Soe
Tjong. This is possibly a sore point for Oei
Tjong Ie. He argues that if he had been al-
lowed to head Kian Gwan Indonesia, he could
have developed close ties with the military
and depended on them for protection [Inter-
view: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 206]. His brother
Tjong Tjay agrees that he was a super-contact
man and that he could have found a patron
among the military leaders [Interview: Oei
Tjong Tjay 1989: 240]. If he had, confiscation
might have been avoided.
The history of Oei Tiong Ham Concern ended
abruptly on July 10, 1961, about two years
before it was scheduled to celebrate its centen-
nial. On that date, deciding on the suit filed
by the government, Pengadilan Ekonomi (the
court for economic crimes) in Semarang
issued a confiscation order [Tjoa 1963: 677].
The Indonesian government and the Oei fam-
ily entered into the first legal battle in the
Netherlands on a blocked reserve fund held
by Bank Indonesia in Amsterdam. The fund
was originally deposited with the Javasche
Bank, but after the bank was nationalized and
renamed Bank Indonesia, it became a deposit
with Bank Indonesia. The Oei family asked
Bank Indonesia in Amsterdam to release the
fund, but the bank refused, so they sued the
bank in the Netherlands. They won the case
and got the reserve fund back [Interview: Oei
Tjong Tjay 1989: 248], but the government
seems to have felt sore about it. Oei Tjong Ie
feels that the suit in Semarang was the Indone-
sian government's retaliation for it.4)
Many Indonesian Chinese feel that the chief
4) Letter from Oei Tjong Ie (December 21, 1987).
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tormentor of the Dei family was the public pro-
secutor Gunawan. It is said that being a fer-
vent nationalist, he hated the Chinese, in par-
ticular, Dei Tiong Ham Concern as the sym-
bol of Chinese success. From the Indonesian
nationalist viewpoint, however, he was an in-
corruptible nationalist whom Dei Tiong Ham
Concern could not bribe, and took action
against it since it had violated law. It is not
clear which view is correct, but he was clearly
the product of Indonesian nationalism which
had a streak of anti-Chineseness at that time.
But it is wrong to think that he acted alone.
As Dei Tjong Tjay argues, the confiscation of
his company was a result of the political
change in the socialist direction which started
in the mid-1950s. From the direction in
which the country was moving, Tjong Tjay
argues, confiscation was a matter of time.
What surprised him a little was that it came
sooner than expected. And he does not think
any particular person masterminded the con-
fiscation, but if a single person should be
named, it must be President Sukamo himself
since he was at the vanguard of the political
change at that time [Interview: Dei Tjong
Tjay 1989: 249]. Mer all, he cleared a legal
barrier by issuing a law which acted against
the legal defense launched by the Dei family
[Interview: Dei Tjong Tjay 1989: 251-252].
The Indonesian government could not
touch Dei Tiong Ham Concern's subsidiaries
and assets abroad. The offices in Singapore,
Amsterdam, New York, and Bangkok re-
mained, but they were seriously affected by the
confiscation, because their activities centered
around the trade with Indonesia. Without
ties with Indonesia, it was difficult to sur-
vive. The New York office soon closed, and
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the Amsterdam office cut down its operation
drastically, whereas the Singapore office
declined gradually over time and today re-
mains only as a small engineering firm; Kian
Gwan (Malaya) no longer exists. It is only the
Bangkok office which did well in the post-con-
fiscation period [Interview: Dei Tjong Ie 1989:
Section 13].
To those who are familiar with successful
Chinese business families in Southeast Asia in
the prewar period and in the early postwar
period, the Dei family seems a little odd. A
typical successful Chinese family at that time
was very Chinese-oriented: the members
spoke Chinese and retained a great deal of
Chinese culture. If they spoke English or
another Western language, they spoke it as
the second language. In the case of the Dei
family, the first generation (Dei Tjie Sien) was
very Chinese, and the second generation (Dei
Tiong Ham) was still Chinese though his
Chineseness was not as much as his father's,
but the third generation Deis had little
Chineseness left. Even Dei Tjong Hauw,
who headed the family for about 25 years
since the mid-1920s, did not have a good
command of a Chinese language; he went
to a Dutch-medium school in Semarang and
seemed to have conducted business largely in
Dutch and Malay (to be more exact, pasar
Malay). His half-brother Tjong Tjay, who
took over after his death, spoke neither
Chinese nor Indonesian well. The brothers
talked to each other in Dutch. In many ways,
the third generation Oeis were Dutch-
oriented. Yet, they were not only accepted in
the Chinese community but also regarded as
its leader [Interview: Dei Tjong Ie 1989: Sec-
tion 13].
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The so-called peranakan Chinese in In-
donesia, to which the third generation Oeis
belong, was a different breed of Chinese in
Southeast Asia. In the other countries in the
region, except a small group of baba Chinese
in Malacca, the people who were regarded as
Chinese usually spoke Chinese. Those who
did not were quickly absorbed into indigenous
society and were not regarded as Chinese
anymore. In Thailand, for example, where
there was a constant influx of Chinese from
southern China over a long period of time, a
large number of their descendants seemed to
have been "lost" to Thai society. In the
Philippines, too, the assimilation process went
on; the more recently assimilated Chinese
were called mestizos and as Filipinos,
spearheaded economic and social changes in
the country [Wickberg 1964].
However, this sort of assimilation did not
take place in Indonesia. The Dutch kept the
Chinese separate from the indigenous popula-
tion by restricting their freedom of residence
and traveling. As in other Southeast Asian
countries, since Chinese women did not come
in a large number until the late 19th century,
the Chinese usually took indigenous women
as their wives, and their children grew up
under the cultural influence of indigenous
mothers. But because of the Dutch policy to
keep the Chinese separate from the in-
digenous population, they remained a cultur-
ally separate group. But they were not Chinese
in the sense that the term is usually
understood. Instead of Chinese, they usually
spoke Malay (some even spoke Dutch in addi-
tion in the late 19th century), and absorbed a
number of indigenous customs. But they
were more Chinese than indigenous, at least
on the surface, since they retained (or were
forced to retain) Chinese names, hair and
dress styles, and some other characteristics.
This group constituted the peranakan
Chinese, in contrast with the China-born,
Chinese-speaking "singkeh." In the 19th cen-
tury, it was from this peranakan group that
the business elites of the Chinese community,
called cahang atas, came. For example, the
tax and revenue farmers and Chinese
officers (such as major and lieutenant) who
were chosen from the cahang atas group
were predominantly peranakan Chinese
[Onghokham 1989: 163].
There was no strong reason for the Oei fam-
ily to remain culturally Chinese. The
peranakan Chinese they dealt with usually
spoke Malay, and their major product, sugar,
had a stronger linkage with the West than
with the Chinese (its market was there and
machines necessary for its production came
from there also). And to carry on a modem
business conglomerate, there were more ad-
vantages in being Dutch-oriented than
Chinese-oriented. For example, to handle its
legal problems, Dutch-trained and Dutch-
speaking lawyers provided better services
(and protection), and for trade finance, Dutch
(and possibly to some extent British) banks
had more money to lend and offered a wider
range of services. And the colonial
bureaucracy which they had to deal with fre-
quently, despite its manifestly laissez faire
policy, was Dutch-speaking. If the Chinese
language skill was really needed, people who
spoke Chinese could be hired. But the areas
where it was necessary were quite limited
(such as the distribution of imported con-
sumer goods to retailers).
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Today, it is not unusual for a large Chinese
businessman in Southeast Asia not to speak
Chinese. Such a Chinese businessman is
usually non-Chinese educated and more
familiar with Western business techniques (he
has gone to either an English-medium school
or local language-medium school, and may
have even studied in the West). His Chinese
cultural base is weak and, in some cases,
dubious, but we consider him Chinese
because carrying a Chinese name or being the
son or grandson of a Chinese immigrant, he is
regarded as an outsider by the indigenous
society and has developed some Chinese
identity. The third generation Oeis are this
type of Chinese who became more prevalent
among the successful Chinese in the postwar
period.
The Oei family was a precursor of the
Chinese business community in another way.
By building a large business based on delega-
tion of authority and professional manage-
ment, Oei Tiong Ham shattered the
stereotype that the Chinese are tradition-
bound and cannot develop a modern business
organization. Despite this· accomplishment,
however, critics may argue that he kept his
business family owned and in this respect, he
was not fully modern-at least, he was more
traditional than some of the Chinese
businessmen today who actively use the stock
market for raising capital. But one should
note that among the large companies (like
Japanese zaibatsu) in prewar Asia, a family-
owned company was the norm and that a fam-
ily-owned company was often better run than
a public company. A family-owned company
may have to become eventually a public com-
pany if it wants to continue to grow in the com-
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petitive environment, but there is no need to
do this in a relatively early stage of develop-
ment since accumulated profits and borrow-
ings from financial institutions can easily
make up for the capital which can be raised in
the stock market. However, family manage-
ment is often a poor substitute for profes-
sional management. And thus, for a con-
siderable period of time, professional manage-
ment is a by far more important parameter
defining business modernization than public
ownership. What Oei Tiong Ham did was
not full-scale but intermediate modernization;
given the historical circumstances, in-
termediate modernization was the only choice
left and the surest way to full-scale moderniza-
tion. It should be remembered that in
Japanese modernization, the zaibatsu did not
go beyond intermediate modernization until
the postwar period.
Oei Tiong Ham was a business pioneer in
still another way. It is often thought that
Chinese capital is commercial and financial
capital, or that since the Chinese do not want
to invest in such long-term assets as industrial
machinery, Chinese capital cannot become in-
dustrial capital. But this view is completely
wrong. In Southeast Asia today, there are
many Chinese-owned big factories (for exam-
pie, Liem Sioe Liong's Indocement in
Cibinong, Indonesia, which is the biggest ce-
ment complex in Asia) and high-story
buildings (for example, OUB Centre in
Singapore, which is the tallest building in
Asia). And that view was proven wrong by
Oei Tiong Ham almost a century ago when he
began investing in sugar mills. Given an en-
vironment in which long-term calculation is
possible, the Chinese are willing to invest in
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long-term assets, and thus, Chinese capital
can be converted into industrial capital. If this
is not done, it is because the Chinese feel in-
secure in their countries of residence and
since they have to take capital with them
when they have to leave, they want to keep
their capital in liquid form.
To get into the manufacturing industry, one
major problem the Chinese faced was modern
technology. But this turned out not so
serious a barrier as generally thought. It is
true that in order to establish modern industry
and spearhead technological progress on a cor-
porate level, there has to be a well developed
technological environment supported by
learned institutions, but it is not terribly difficult
to master mature technologies. In the case of
Oei Tiong Ham Concern, a number of Dutch
engineers were used, but as some Chinese
came back with engineering degrees from the
Netherlands, they began taking over technical
posts from the Dutch (for example, Yap Kie
Ling, who replaced two Dutch engineers in
the headquarters in Semarang in the 1930s
[Liem 1979: 218]). Lower levels of
technical skill had been handled by the
Chinese staff much earlier (for example, the
skill to work on an engine was probably first
mastered on a steamship and transferred later
to factories such as sugar mills [Interview: Oei
Tjong Ie 1989: 195]). In a way, Oei Tiong
Ham Concern was a pioneer in the replacement
of Western engineers with Chinese and the
introduction of new technologies, which became
more common among the Chinese firms in
later, especially postwar, years.
The growth and decline of Oei Tiong Ham
Concern make us acutely aware that
businesses are, as the French historian Fer-
nand Braudel would argue, "the subset of a
greater set" [Braudel 1979: 458-461]. One
crucial component of the greater set is the at-
titude of the government toward business;
especially how much freedom the government
gives to business and how political power is
regulated when it is exercised over business.
In Dutch Java, the Chinese were
discriminated against in many ways (e.g.
they were not allowed to travel freely or
reside in the place of their choice), but Chi-
nese discrimination became less of a problem
from the late 19th century [Onghokham 1989:
173], as the colonial government created the
institutional order in which Dutch private
capital could play a major role in develop-
ment. Oei Tiong Ham and many other
Chinese benefited from this legal-institutional
order.
Unfortunately, after independence, the
colonial economic order was rejected in
Indonesia. This was also bound to happen in
the Philippines and Malaya, but in Indonesia,
since the people had to fight for in-
dependence, rejection of the colonial order
came sooner and in a more drastic way than in
the Philippines and Malaya where there were
no political upheavals in the transition to in-
dependence. What replaced the colonial
economic order of Indonesia was eventually a
government-dominated, autarkic economy.
Foreign capital was regarded more and more
as an instrument for perpetuating colonialism
and finally nationalized by the government
(Dutch capital in 1957, British capital in 1963,
and American capital in 1965). And also,
there was an anti-Chinese feeling as a reaction
to Dutch colonialism: Indonesian leaders
tended to regard the Chinese as the collabora-
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tors of the Dutch in the exploitation of their
country. Government intervention in the
economy was not bad by itself, but Indonesia,
like many other newly independent countries,
did not know how to rationally contain and
regulate the exercise of government power in
the economy. Like a typical revolutionary il-
literate in economics, Sukarno, who emerged
as the dominant leader of Indonesia in the
1950s, rejected capitalism as a supporting in-
stitution of colonialism and in the process of
replacing it with socialism, destroyed the effi-
ciency of the economy. It was under this
anti-Chinese and anti-capitalistic setting that
Oei Tiong Ham Concern declined.
What made the situation worse was con-
siderable skepticism about economic
liberalism and support for extensive govern-
ment interference among the intellectuals
who had been influenced by socialist and
liberal political ideologies in the West. This
intellectual atmosphere still remains today
and affects the role of government in the
economy. But one has to realize that when
government is not good government, exten-
sive government interference can easily
bankrupt the economy. It may be emotion-
ally difficult to accept the possibility that one's
own government is not good, but if it is not
good, it is better to face up to the reality. To
judge whether a particular government is
good or not and whether it will improve in per-
formance in the near future may not be easy,
but in Indonesia, judging from past records
and the miserable standard of living today,
government performance is far from satisfac-
tory, and the economy seems to considerably
improve if economic liberalism was restored
as the dominant economic ideology.
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One may argue that government interven-
tion is necessary to control Chinese economic
power and promote indigenous participation
in the modem economy. We are well aware
that the Chinese are still a political and social
problem in Indonesia, but it should be realized
that economic development is a terribly diffi-
cult task. In the early postwar period, as a
sort of negative reaction to the prewar
ideologies to perpetuate colonial rule, op-
timistic views on the prospect for develop-
ment became dominant among the intellec-
tuals in both developed and developing coun-
tries, but after a few decades of in-
dependence, economic development (in the
sense that the masses, being liberated from
poverty, enjoy a decent standard of living) is
still a distant hope. Optimism still remains
strong, but if the past records and prevailing
economic situation are objectively reassessed,
one would get struck with the enormity of the
development problem. The Chinese problem
should be dealt with within this context.
The decline of Oei Tiong Ham Concern in
the postwar period and its confiscation by the
Sukarno government in 1961 were undoubt-
edly painful events for the Oei family as
well as for the people who worked for the com-
pany. At the same time, they were tragic
events for the Indonesian economy as a
whole. In that period, all rationally run
businesses suffered, being subjected
to the abuse of governmental power. But
this was tolerated because the intellectual
climate at that time was such that something
was intrinsically wrong with the economic
liberalism of the colonial period. Fortunately
(from the economic viewpoint), Sukarno was
ousted from power in 1965, and a new political
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order was established. As a result, the
economy has improved in the past two decades,
but a legacy of government intervention
still remains strong.
What a developing country like Indonesia
has to do is to restore the old liberal economic
ideology which regards private initiative as
the primary force of economic development.
Certainly, economic development (as just
defined above) cannot be brought about in a
short time, but a great deal can be done to im-
prove the economic situation. For example,
since the gap in wages between Japan and In-
donesia, which is over 40 times,5) can generate
export, Indonesia can export a number of pro-
ducts soon and still more in the near future as
more capital is accumulated and more ex-
perience.is gained. This increase in exports
will enable Indonesia to reduce the gap in
wages and income with Japan and raise its liv-
ing standard. Of course, Indonesia can direct
exports to other countries (especially high-
income countries). What is important is to
realize that trade can act as the engine of
growth. But for this to come about, the
economic system of the country has to
restrain and regulate the exercise of govern-
ment power in the economy and encourage
private initiative. This is essentially what the
old liberal economic ideology preached.
There is nothing wrong with an old ideology.
In fact, new ones caused a fiasco and brought
economic misery to postwar Indonesia. In
5) According to the most recent issue of Asiaweek
available at the time of this writing Gune 3, 1988),
Indonesia's per capita GDP is $500, while Japan's
is $22,825.
view of economic slowdown in recent years in
the country, now is a good time to reflect on
the virtue of the old economic liberalism
which brought about the rise of such an In-
donesian business empire as Oei Tiong Ham
Concern. If it is restored, we may be able to
witness the rise of dynamic capitalism which
once spearheaded economic development in
the country and will undoubtedly do so again
in the future.
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Appendix: The Oei Family
I. Oei Djing Poe (1789-1877)
wife: Tjan Moay Nio (1792-1857)
sons
1. Oei King Tjien
2. Oei King Tauw
3. Oei Wie Sian
4. Oei Sien Tjo
5. Oei Ing Soen
6. Oei Tjie Sien
:IT. Oei Tjie Sien (1835-1900)
wife: Tjan Bien Nio (1839-1896)
sons
1. Oei Tiong Tjhian (left in China)
2. Oei Tiong Ham
3. Dei Tiong Bing
4. Dei Tiong An (stillborn?)
m. Oei Tiong Ham (1866-1924)
wife children
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a) Goei Bing Nio
b) The Khiam Nio
c) The Tjik Nio
d) Ong Tjiang Tjoe Nio
e) Ong Mie Hoa Nio
f) Njoo Swat Ting Nio
g) Ho Kiem Hoa Nio
h) Tan Sien Nio
1. Oei Tjong Lan (f) (1886- ?)
2. Dei Hui Lan (f) (1889- )
1. Oei Djoe Nio (f) (1903- ?)
1. Dei Tjong Tee (m) (1895- ?)
2. Dei Hwan Nio (f) (1897- ?)
3. Oei Tjong Swan (m) (1899- ?)
4. Dei Den Nio (f) (1900- ?)
5. Oei Tjong Yoe (m) (1903- ?)
6. Dei Tjong Tiong (m) (1904- ?)
7. Dei Liang Nio (f) (1906- ?)
8. Dei Tjong Liam (m) (1906- ?)
9. Oei Siok Kiong Nio (f) (1910- ?)
1. Dei Siok Kiong Nio (f) (1907- ?)
2. Dei Bien Nio (f) (1913- ?)
1. Oei Tjong Hauw (m) (1904-1950)
2. Dei Swat Nio (f) (1908- ?)
3. Oei Tjong Tjiat (m) (1909-1957)
4. Oei Tjong Yan (m) (1912- ?)
5. Dei Tjong Ik (m) (1916- )
1. Dei Siok Ing Nio (f) (1915- ?)
1. Dei Tjong Ie (m) (1918- )
2. Dei Twan Nio (f) (1920- )
3. Dei Tjong Bo (m) (1922- )
4. Dei Tjong Hiong (m) (1923- )
5. Oei Tjong Tjay (m) (1924- )
1. Dei Siang Nio (f) (?- ?)
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N. Oei Tjong Tee (ill -c-l)
children: 1. Oei Ping Yan (f)
2. Oei Leodi (f)
Oei Tjong Swan (ill -c-3)
children: 1. Oei Ing Tjhing (m)
2. Oei Ing Hing (m)
3. Oei Ing Bian (m)
4. Oei Ing Wan (m)
Oei Tjong Liam (ill -c-8)
children: 1. Oei Ing Siang (m)
2. Oei Ing Ie (m)
Oei Tjong Hauw (ill-e-l)
wife: Be Hien Nio
children: 1. Oei Ing Swie (m)
2. Oei Ing Lhie (m)
3. Oei Ing Gie (m)
Oei Tjong Tjiat (ill -e-3)
wife: B. Betuwe
Oei Tjong Ik (ill -e-5)
wife: L.A. Livain
children: 1. Oei Ing King (m)
2. Oei Ing Tjiang (m)
3. Oei Ing Tjee (m)
4. Oei Lian Hwa (f)
Oei Tjong Ie (ill -g-l)
wife: M.S. Mathysen
children: 1. Oei Ing Tjien (m)
2. Oei Ing Kiang (m)
Oei Tjong Hiong (ill -g-4)
wife: Oei Tien Nio
children: 1. Oei Ing Tjong (m)
2. Oei Siok Tien (f)
3. Oei Siok Ing (f)
Oei Tjong Tjay (ill -g-5)
wife: M.L. Blanc
children: 1. Oei Siok Lian (f)
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